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Television is the primary, and most effective, tool employed by the political regime to influence its people, and the federal television 
networks are critical elements of the political system in Putin’s Russia.1 
Eighty-eight percent of the Russian population use television news as 
their prime source of information, 65 percent regard the news reporting as 
objective, and 51 percent trust television as an information source.2 What 
the Russian viewers see on state-aligned television is strongly shaped 
by the Kremlin. Particularly during Putin’s third presidential term, news 
reporting has become more propagandistic.3 Often without being told what 
to do, journalists, reporters and television hosts are usually keen to get it 
right and do what they think that the authorities want them to do. Yet at the 
same time they are also individuals with their own characters and ideas.
This article will explore processes around media governance on 
federal television networks during Putin’s third presidential term, in 
particular the question of self-censorship among presenters, reporters and 
media personalities. It will discuss the ways in which the media adapt 
how news is made and framed to the expectations of the authorities. It will 
make comparisons between renowned media personalities and less or little 
known “rank-and-file” reporters.
Questions around censorship and self-censorship are familiar to 
Russian reporters4 and have attracted a fair degree of academic attention, 
especially from social scientists working on Ukraine and Central Asia.5 
As Sarah Oates concluded from the study of the television coverage of 
Russian elections, reporters chose to adjust the message their reports 
deliver to the position of their political masters.6 Censorship, the outright 
prohibition, alteration or suppression of thoughts in media outlets or 
other forms of public expression, is usually linked to coercive tactics 
1 This article was produced as a part of the AHRC-funded project “Mediating Post-Soviet 
Difference: An Analysis of Russian Television Representations of Inter-Ethnic Cohesion Is-
sues,” carried out by Professor Stephen Hutchings and Professor Vera Tolz at the University 
of Manchester.
2 Levada Center. 2013. “Otkuda rossiiane uznaiut novosti.” The poll conducted on June 20-
24 2013, at http://www.levada.ru/08-07-2013/otkuda-rossiyane-uznayut-novosti, accessed 
November 12, 2013.
3 Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz. 2014. Mediating Post-Soviet Difference. (Monograph 
in progress).
4 “Razgovory o media: Maksim Koval’skii i Mikhail Zygar’.” 2012. Afisha. August 3, at 
http://gorod.afisha.ru/archive/media-kovalski-zygar/, accessed November 10, 2013; Robert 
W. Orttung and Christoper Walker. 2013. “Putin and Russia’s Crippled Media. Russian Ana-
lytical Digest 123, February 21: 2-5, here p 2.
5 Marta Dyczok. 2006. “Was Kuchma’s censorship effective? Mass media in Ukraine before 
2004.” Europe-Asia Studies 58: 2: 215-238; on Central Asia see Timothy Kenny and Peter 
Gross. 2008. “Journalism in Central Asia: A Victim of Politics, Economics, and Widespread 
Self-censorship.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13:4 (October): 515-525.
6 Sarah Oates. 2006. Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia. London: Routledge, 194.
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imposed upon those not complying. Self-censorship implies a self-in-
flicted restriction of free expression, also arising from subordination to 
the political interests as well as fear of superiors.7 We argue that many 
reporters act out of conformism. “Conformism” is a difficult notion, as it 
can mean both opportunism and routinized willingness to accept unques-
tioningly the usual practices or standards, which were originally imposed 
through coercion. The latter case was typical for the Soviet Union; first, 
coercion forced reporters and public activists to suppress their thoughts, 
which, later, became the silently accepted norm of behavior to get by 
without trouble. The term “adekvatnost’” which was used by a number of 
the reporters who agreed to speak to us, but without attribution, appeared 
to combine the two differing concepts of conformism. 
The issue of conformism in news making was studied by Olessia 
Koltsova. Among other things, she analyzed the role of censorship and 
self-censorship in the day-to-day practices of Russian journalists, as well 
as how they conformed to their superiors’ wishes. According to Koltsova’s 
study, rank-and-file journalists in the mid-2000s were not particularly 
interested in the political aspects of their management’s decision making. 
They would have agreed anyway, which gave them leeway to express their 
own thoughts.8 
With regards to self-censorship, we will draw on Koltsova’s News 
Media and Power in Russia. However, we will shift the focus from local 
channels examined in her study to Russia’s federal television channels. In 
Putin’s third presidential term, massive changes have taken place in the 
television landscape. A close examination of the reporters currently active 
in Russia will allow us to determine whether self-censorship has remained 
one of the most significant elements of media governance. 
This article challenges the view that self-censorship, if understood 
as a concept based on fear, is the main regulator in Russian media gover-
nance. Instead, we argue that media personalities and reporters on Russian 
federal television channels do have the option to avoid reporting news 
which contradict their own political convictions. Those media personali-
ties and reporters who work in positions which involve direct promotion 
of Kremlin positions usually have chosen to do so, and do it deliberately.
Methodology and Empirical Data 
We were particularly interested in whether Russian media governance is 
based on coercion or whether media personalities and reporters primarily 
7 Masha Gessen. 2005. “Fear and Self-Censorship in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.” Nieman 
Reports Summer 2005, at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.aspx?id=101154, 
accessed on November 11 2013. 
8 Olessia Koltsova. 2006. News Media and Power in Russia. London: Routledge, 138-142, 
148.
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conform to the ideas and values promoted by the current regime. To 
learn more about how media personalities and reporters perceive policies 
imposed by their editors and how they assess their own role, we conducted 
interviews with renowned media personalities as well as “ordinary” 
reporters.
We attempted to interview reporters, presenters and anchors from 
the widest possible political spectrum covered by the federal television 
channels. Those opposed to the Putin regime who have openly raised 
issues of censorship were excluded, as their opinion is publicly available. 
Instead, we were keen to interview reporters, presenters and anchors 
affiliated to state-aligned television who do not usually talk about issues 
of censorship and self-censorship. Also, we sought to find interviewees 
at different stages of their careers and on different hierarchical levels. We 
eventually conducted interviews with 13 media personalities and reporters 
between January and August 2013 in Moscow. Eight have been used for 
this analysis; 4 famous media personalities and 4 rank-and-file reporters. 
These individuals were chosen in order to represent an even spread within 
the ranks of the broadcasting companies. We were therefore afforded the 
opportunity to analyze at two different levels how these individuals assess 
self-censorship. 
The four famous media personalities (Dmitrii Kiselev/then Rossiia, 
later appointed by Putin as head of Rossiia Segodnia), Arkadii Mamontov/
Rossiia, Maksim Shevchenko/Channel 1, and Anton Krasovskii/formerly 
NTV) allowed us to refer to them by name. These four individuals represent 
a relatively wide political spectrum, from deeply conservative to relatively 
liberal, both in a political and economic sense. Given their present or past 
affiliation with the Kremlin, we need to take into consideration that their 
responses could be toeing the line. 
The second set of interviewees consists of relatively unknown report-
ers who work for important prime-time news programs on major television 
channels. Channel 1 is Russia’s main television channel, commanding a 
14.4 percent market share, 75 percent of which is controlled by the state. 
Rossiia, the second most popular television channel with a 13.2 percent 
market share, is part of the state-owned media holding VGTRK (All-Russia 
State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company). NTV and REN TV are 
privately owned television channels with audience shares of 12.1 percent 
and 5.2 percent, respectively. The main shareholders enjoy close links to 
the Kremlin. Overall, these four channels cover 44.9 percent of all Russian 
television viewers.9 
9 All audience shares are given according to the TNS Gallup poll conducted between October 
21-27, 2013, at http://www.tns-global.ru/rus/data/ratings/tv/index.wbp?tv.action=search&tv.
regionId=9B17541D-53F1-4092-BD51-83041DDAB639&tv.startDate=21.10.2013&tv.end-
Date=27.10.2013&tv.raitingNameId=0FE4F395-898A-4187-B3BB-3DC1C077622E, ac-
cessed November 10, 2013.
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In these interviews we focused on more technical questions related 
to everyday journalistic practices and procedures: how agendas are set, 
how decision-making mechanisms operate, and how hiring practices work. 
Except for one case (the REN TV reporter), our incognito reporters repre-
sent the same channels as the renowned media personalities. However, 
they are at the lower end of the internal company hierarchies. Interviewing 
journalists at the higher and lower end of the spectrum allowed us to gain 
an insight into two different levels of media governance and editorial hier-
archies. These lower-level interviewees preferred to remain anonymous.
In our analysis, we focused on the media personalities’ and report-
ers’ career trajectories, political views and the power relations expressed 
in their narratives, both between them and media authorities as well as 
between them and their audience. Our aim was to reconstruct contempo-
rary television governance on the basis of our interview analysis and the 
contextualization of the collected narratives within information gathered 
from openly available sources, including academic analyses. 
We will first discuss the responses given by our four well-known 
interviewees regarding censorship and self-censorship. Then we will look 
into the narratives and self-perception of the incognito reporters. These 
two sets of interviews are used as the basis for our main argument that 
media personalities and reporters perceive self-censorship in contemporary 
Russia under Putin’s third term as being, first, deliberately applied, i.e. 
out of conviction and, second, free of coercion. Hence, conclusions drawn 
from their narratives are that, instead of being repressed individuals, they 
have sufficient opportunities to choose not to write or articulate things 
they disagree with.
Renowned Media Personalities: Career Trajectories, Political 
Views and Censorship 
The famous media personalities enjoy their celebrity status for different 
reasons; they are characters, often sharp, witty, provocative and non-con-
formist. The television networks’ need to keep ratings up means that 
management has to give in to the occasionally complex, vain and erratic 
nature of their most famous television hosts, pundits and anchors. Hence, 
notwithstanding the state’s attempt at stricter media control, consumers of 
state-aligned television can still enjoy listening to a broad range of politi-
cally provocative and non-orthodox ideas. At the same time it is absolutely 
clear to these individuals who has the final say and to whom they have to 
subordinate. Since the start of Putin’s third presidency, it has become more 
difficult to balance these dichotomies. 
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Career trajectories 
Dmitrii Kiselev (Rossiia) was appointed by Putin as the head of the state-
owned news agency Rossiia Segodnia in December 2013. Until 2012, he 
served as the deputy director of the state-owned media holding VGTRK. 
During the time of the interview in March 2013 he was author and presenter 
of Vesti Nedeli, the second most popular weekly Sunday news program. 
Arkadii Mamontov from the Rossiia channel is the author and host 
of the talk show Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent. The show raises topical 
and controversial political issues. Their aim is to spread the Kremlin line 
among the public. The experts and guest speakers are chosen in order to 
provoke heated discussions. A number of Mamontov’s shows even caused 
diplomatic scandals.10 
Maksim Shevchenko (Channel 1) is the former host of the talk shows 
Sudite sami and V kontekste. He became acclaimed for his sharp and witty 
discussion style in Sudite sami. Shevchenko’s public activities extend 
to political activism. For example, he took part in election campaigns, 
supporting Kremlin-loyal politicians.11 
Anton Krasovskii was formerly a presenter on the Kremlin-sponsored 
online channel Kontr TV. Prior to this, he worked on NTV from 2010 
to 2012 as editor and host of the popular talk show NTVshniki which 
discussed current political affairs and was closed down in summer 2012. 
In between his employment at NTV and his post at Kontr TV, Krasovskii 
made a name as a presenter on NTV and briefly as a campaign manager for 
the oligarch and 2012 presidential candidate, Mikhail Prokhorov. Lately, 
Krasovskii has published articles in The Guardian and other Western 
European newspapers on homophobia in Russia.
Political views
These four media personalities are, or at least used to be, loyal to the 
government. They act as executors of state policies. Despite their loyalty 
to the Kremlin, they are also bold and vain characters, whose showman-
ship and partly radical views are crucial to keep viewer ratings up, and the 
audience entertained.
10 The government of Tajikistan, for example, raised sharp criticism of a hate campaign in 
a series of television shows in spring 2013 directed at Central Asian migrants. Mamontov’s 
Spetsial’nyi Korrespondent took an active part in this campaign. 2013. “MID RT: Rossiia 
nachala shirokomasshtabnuiu informatsionnuiu kampaniiu protiv Tadzhikistana,” Avesta.tj, 
April 24, 2013, at http://www.avesta.tj/goverment/18037-mid-rt-rossiya-nachala-shiroko-
masshtabnuyu-informacionnuyu-kampaniyu-protiv-tadzhikistana.html, accessed February 
26, 2014.
11 For example, Shevchenko was an official supporter of Moscow’s mayor Sergei Sobianin 
during the summer 2013 electoral campaign in Moscow. Ilya Azar. 2013. “Sobianin po 
proiskhozhdeniiu – korennoi evraziets.” Lenta.ru. July 30, 2013, at http://lenta.ru/arti-
cles/2013/07/30/shevchenko/, accessed November 10, 2013.
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Kiselev is a militant defender of the Putin regime. In 2013, The 
Economist labeled him “Russia’s chief propagandist.”12 In the interview 
with us, he declared the growing “Islamic threat” one of his personal prior-
ity topics.13 In the West, Kiselev has become known for his homophobic 
statements, his anti-Western stance and, lately, for his ferocious support 
of Putin’s Ukraine/Crimea policies, for which his name appeared in the 
list of individuals targeted by EU sanctions.14 In the 1990s Kiselev was 
a strong advocate of liberal views and unconditionally defended the 
rights of the Fourth Estate. His program Okno v Evropu (Window onto 
Europe) promoted a cosmopolitan view of the world. In a discussion in 
1999, Kiselev claimed that a reporter has no right to be a propagandist.15 
Since then his position has taken a U-turn and he considers it to be one 
of a reporter’s primary tasks to produce new values, educate the Russian 
people, and establish new norms. 
Mamontov is as radical in his patriotic conservatism as Kiselev. 
He is notorious, in particular, for his views on migrants, and his crude 
approach to journalism. One reporter we talked to called him “a symbol 
of propaganda.”16 Mamontov became famous as a war reporter on NTV 
in the 1990s, a time when the news channel was known for its critical 
coverage of the military conflict in Chechnya. (After Gazprom took over 
the network following Putin’s rise to power, it supports the Kremlin’s 
position). Mamontov’s stance changed in 2000, after he joined the state-
owned VGTRK, from being critical of the regime into being highly critical 
of Russia’s “enemies,” both within and outside the country. In the 2000s he 
began to play a major role on behalf of the Kremlin to trigger events which 
resulted in the justification for the repression of political oppositionists. 17 
A common reference point for these two media personalities is the 
first post-Soviet decade. They look at the 1990s resentfully. Mamontov 
remembered: “1993 [when Yeltsin crushed the parliament by force] had 
great influence on me. I was in the White House [the parliament] and saw 
everything. I began to understand that they betrayed us. They were not 
democrats, but swindlers, who looted my country pretending to be demo-
crats. They looted it and carried the money to the West. Eighty percent of 
12 2013. “Russia’s chief propagandist.”The Economist, December 10, at http://www.econo-
mist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/12/ukraine, accessed April 3, 2014.
13 Dmitrii Kiselev. 2013. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl, Moscow, March 27.
14 Peter Spiegel and Christian Oliver. 2014. “EU adds new names to visa bans.” The Financial 
Times, March 21, at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/315b890a-b090-11e3-8058-00144feab-
7de.html#axzz2xp7wCLcA, accessed April 3, 2014. 
15 2012. “Dmitrii Kiselev o zhurnalistike (1999 g.),” at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6yhrKB7sr6I, accessed November 10, 2013. 
16 Anonymous interviewee. 2013. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
17 Svetlana Meteleva, Aleksandr Raskin. 2006. “Spetskor upolnomochen zaiavit’,” Russkii 
Newsweek no. 4, January 30, 17.
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my country thinks like this.”18 Also, the former liberal Kiselev looks back at 
the 1990s as a dark decade and highly approves of Putin’s turn to anti-lib-
eralism: “We can’t rely on Western liberalism… By 2000 Russia was close 
to falling apart. Entire regions did not pay taxes, we had a war, and one 
region after the other declared its independence from Moscow. Putin put 
everything back together, found the political will and saved the country.”19 
The U-turn these two media personalities made from being staunch liberals 
to anti-liberals probably partly explains the ferociousness of their present 
stance. However, this does not mean that their former liberal outlook was 
any less conformist than their new anti-liberal outlook. In the 1990s it was 
fashionable to be a liberal and today it is fashionable to be an anti-liberal.
In contrast to Mamontov and Kiselev, Shevchenko represents a later 
generation of pro-Kremlin pundits. His generation of media personalities 
did not go through a transformation from liberal to conservative, but was 
formed by the Putin administration in the 2000s. As public intellectuals 
of the new millennium, representatives of this generation articulated the 
various ideological concepts which the presidential administration had 
developed. In addition, they went along with the policy changes the pres-
idential administration undertook. Despite this fealty to the authorities’ 
changing positions, ironically, these younger media personalities enjoy 
more legitimacy both in public and in journalistic circles. In contrast to the 
older generation, they never collaborated with the Yeltsin regime, which 
became increasingly discredited in the late 2000s, often by those who 
supported it in the 1990s. The older generation had entered a treaty with the 
“devil” when supporting Yeltsin’s presidential campaign by participating 
in a propaganda campaign which led to his re-election in 1996.20 The fact 
that Shevchenko was not involved in it makes his criticism of Russia’s 
neoliberalism and the pro-Western attitudes, which the political establish-
ment of the 1990s advocated, more credible. 
Being popular for his provocative statements and sharp criticism 
of the West, Shevchenko combines contradictory views in a blend which 
polarizes and at the same attracts audiences, ensuring his popularity. He 
entertains his audiences with political statements which oscillate between 
the left and the far right. As he explained in the interview with us and often 
states publicly, Shevchenko favors a strong state which opposes the West.21 
He advocates a return to some socialist elements in education. He justifies 
18 Mamontov. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl, Moscow, March 28.
19 Kiselev. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
20 Ivan Zassoursky. 2004. Media and Power in post-Soviet Russia. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
64-79.
21 Maksim Shevchenko. 2013. “My ne Evropa? I slava bogu!”, Moskovskii komsomolets, 
February 11, at http://www.mk.ru/specprojects/free-theme/article/2013/02/10/810258-myi-
ne-evropa-i-slava-bogu.html, accessed 24 February, 2014.
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Stalin’s terror as well as the Soviet campaigns against Jews and identifies 
with, for example, Austria’s right-wing on the issue of immigration.22 
Shevchenko frequently presents himself as standing in opposition 
to the regime, which in occasional statements consists of bureaucrats and 
criminals. In one interview, he even demanded that the authorities should 
not treat political prisoners too harshly.23 Nevertheless, he is considered to 
be loyal to the Kremlin. Paradoxically, this apparent inconsistency makes 
him extremely useful as an official media personality. Political flexibility 
and the ability to quickly adapt his political identity to the regime’s chang-
ing line afford Shevchenko the opportunity to stay within the bounds of 
what the authorities consider acceptable. For this reason, he enjoys far 
more freedom and leeway to make critical statements against the regime 
than many of his colleagues.
Anton Krasovskii was the only media celebrity who did not toe 
the Kremlin line. Only a few weeks prior to our interview he lost 
his job on Kontr TV for announcing live on air that he is gay. Like 
Shevchenko, Krasovskii represents the post-2000 generation. Many of 
them are extremely cynical about the current state of things in the country 
and lack general trust in democracy, including the democratic demands 
which the opposition movement put forward. “Like Stolypin, my aim is a 
Great Russia. The liberals aim at destroying and looting Russia. Nobody 
can change my opinion. I know many of them [in the liberal opposition] 
personally. They are not the best people. Any average member of Putin’s 
United Russia [Edinaia Rossiia] is much closer to me than any Aleksei 
Navalny,” Krasovskii argues.24 Despite being banned from work on 
state-aligned television in Russia because of his public criticism of the 
authorities, Krasovskii still approves of the current regime and sharply 
criticizes the Russian opposition movement.25
Views on censorship
In his prominent position, Kiselev is as much censor as the censored: “I 
write my own texts and nobody reads them in advance, i.e. there is no 
censorship whatsoever.”26 In the interview with us, he stressed freedom 
of opinion and diversity as being important aspects of his program: “Our 
reporters represent a wide range of views and political opinions. We have 
conservative ones, and we have liberals. I am myself an enlightened 
22 Shevchenko. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
23 Ilya Azar. 2013. “Sobianin po proiskhozhdeniiu – korennoi evraziets.”
24 Anton Krasovskii. 2013. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl, Moscow, March 26.
25 Sergei Korzun. “Bez durakov.” 2013. Radio Ekho Moskvy. September 21, at http://echo.
msk.ru/programs/korzun/1159140-echo/#element-text, accessed November 10, 2013.
26 Kiselev. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
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conservative, a moderate conservative.”27 Kiselev’s tolerance of political 
diversity has clear limits. It ends where political views are not in accor-
dance with the current regime, in particular with Putin. The rationale here 
is simple and clear; every reporter who is opposed to the government 
should find a medium not financed by the government to work for. Due 
to his powerful position in the media hierarchy, Kiselev influences how 
information policies are shaped: “In general, being a well-known reporter, 
I make politics. I am in a strong position to do so.”28 
However, Kiselev sees his role far beyond the task of news making: 
“I act as God, as Jesus Christ. On television, I have a role as the creator. 
This is not because I want it. This is because since the Soviet era only 
20 years have passed... If English reporters found themselves in such a 
situation, they would have done the same [as us]. One hundred percent. 
We are obliged to colonize our own country, and the English are excellent 
colonizers. They imposed their values in many parts of the world.”29 Here, 
references to the West serve to legitimize the missionary vocation. 
In sharp contrast to Kiselev, Mamontov named the lack of freedom 
of speech as one of the most pressing issues in Russia today: “We need 
freedom of speech as much as we need air to breath. We need it to be able 
to talk about corruption. To uncover it and to talk about it. We need to be 
able to say who is a crook and who is a thief.”30 However, this cannot be 
interpreted as an expression of criticism of the current media governance.31 
Instead, Mamontov cleverly turns the tables. He takes up burning issues 
which have been frequently raised by the opposition movement, such 
as corruption, migration policies, and widening social inequality in the 
country. He then flips them to support his own agenda, thereby neutralizing 
the opposition. 
Mamontov’s framing of the origins of self-censorship shows a 
certain cunning. Being an important actor of Kremlin media policies, he 
does admit that there is self-censorship, something everybody suspects 
anyway. However, he does not point a finger at the government, or the 
media elite, for why censorship and self-censorship have prevailed. 
Instead, he blames the backward Russian people for it: “Freedom of speech 
does exist, but is not supported by the people’s mentality. Its mentality is 
different; it is still Soviet.”32
27 Kiselev. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
28 Kiselev. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
29 Kiselev. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
30 Arkadii Mamontov. 2013. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
31 Neither was it a rare statement. Instead, he has frequently taken up similar issues. See, for 
example, 2013. “Mamontov Arkadii Viktorovich. Master klass 18.05.2011.” October 3, at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dcY1i9NgWNc, accessed November 10, 2013.
32 Mamontov. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
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Mamontov includes himself when attempting criticism; “I censor 
myself at times, after all I am a Soviet person.”33 To illustrate this, 
Mamontov cited a corruption scandal, which erupted in 2012 around the 
Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdiukov and his lover Evgeniia Vasil’eva 
“who adored luxuries.”34 Serdiukov’s departure from the government 
was, among other things, triggered by the documentary which Mamontov 
produced for his show. The documentary described the scale of corruption 
among Serdiukov’s close circle. Mamontov explained: “We could have 
said much more about her [the lover], but we decided not to… I was afraid 
that it would annoy people too much.”35 This self-censorship, as Mamontov 
further elaborated, is related to two things. First, there is a lack of a culture 
of speaking out and articulating criticism. Second, Russian newsmakers 
are reluctant to say what they think for fear of unexpected consequences.36 
Similarly to Kiselev, Shevchenko ferociously defended his channel’s 
governance by claiming journalistic and editorial freedom: “There is no 
self-censorship; we have a normal editorial policy. This is not any different 
to what any reporter from the Frankfurter Allgemeine or the Kurier expe-
riences... If I put my money into a channel or a newspaper, why should I 
be forced to like everybody? This is why there is such a thing as editorial 
policy. If the state invests money in a media outlet, it has the right to 
demand that it follows the state’s policy.”37
Compared to the celebrity hosts we discussed previously, Krasovskii’s 
statements about censorship and self-censorship were more explicit. He 
admitted that direct censorship existed at his workplace. At the same time 
he saw great freedom of expression which he referred back to geographi-
cal factors, among other things. Whenever reporters transgress acceptable 
boundaries, the time zones in Russia enable the authorities to stop such 
disagreeable programs. It will simply be taken off air: “A program first 
appears on screen in the Far East, and nobody watches it. The population 
there is small, they are not interested and many don’t even have a TV set. 
You can show them whatever you want. Then, if some program doesn’t 
find approval, it is simply taken off the screen. Anyway in Irkutsk, nobody 
will see it.”38 This distinctive feature also demonstrates the flexible nature 
of media control in Russia: in many ways it does not need coercive mech-
anisms, whilst still affording reporters their creative freedom.39
33 Mamontov. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
34 Mamontov. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
35 Mamontov. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
36 Mamontov. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
37 Maksim Shevchenko. 2013. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl, Moscow, April 3.
38 Krasovskii. Interviewed by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
39 2011. “Na NTV siuzhet o pokhishcheniiakh liudei v Chechne vyrezali iz pereda-
chi “Tsentral’noe televidenie”.” Gazeta.ru. October 3, at http://www.gazeta.ru/news/len-
ta/2011/10/31/n_2076166.shtml, accessed November 10, 2013.
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Self-censorship was, according to Krasovskii, no issue in the tele-
vision projects he participated in. These include the liberally inclined 
television shows NTVshniki and Tsentral’noe Televidenie. They were noto-
rious for their occasionally scandalous approach and attempts to report on 
issues which were excluded from the programs on other federal channels. 
However, these two shows, together with a few others on federal television, 
are rare exceptions enjoying significant freedom to report on cutting edge 
issues without being subject to censorship.
By contrast to these individuals who demonstrate solid loyalty to 
the regime, most of Russia’s major (free-thinking) media personalities 
disappeared from television screens in the 2000s as soon as they made 
open and honest statements.40 One of Russia’s most successful political 
reporters, Leonid Parfenov, lost his job on NTV in 2004 because he ignored 
the prohibition on reporting the war in Chechnya.41 His removal was the 
first major act of censorship by a federal television company owner in 
the 2000s. In 2010, Parfenov publicly stated that reporters had become 
bureaucrats unwilling to criticize top-ranking politicians and that political 
journalism had degraded into merely praising the political leadership.42 
Up to now, he has remained persona-non-grata in political programs on 
state-aligned television. His political unpredictability makes him one 
of the most visible examples of censorship in the history of post-Soviet 
television.43 The fact that Parfenov has been allowed to keep one film a 
year on Channel 1 (on Russian culture and history) is a clever move of the 
regime; by still allowing Parfenov to appear on screen, they can claim that 
freedom of information does exist. Another highly acclaimed television 
reporter, Vladimir Pozner, managed to keep his programs at the state-
aligned Channel 1, despite openly admitting that the head of the channel 
interfered with who he was allowed to invite onto his show.44 
Pozner and Parfenov clearly have different political positions 
compared to most of the media personalities we talked to. One must 
40 Most of those who stayed on television throughout the 2000s were made redundant during 
the editorial purges at the beginning of Putin’s third term. For more, see, for example, Arina 
Borodina. 2013. “Pavel Lobkov: ne podnimu tost ni za zdravie, ni za upokoi NTV,” RIA 
Novosti, 10 October, at http://ria.ru/interview/20131010/968861350.html#ixzz2hgsjJlfD, 
accessed February 26, 2014. 
41 Afanasii Sborov. 2004. “Kto uvolil Leonida Parfenova,” Kommersant-Vlast’, 7 June, at 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/480909, accessed 28 February 2014.
42 2010. “Vystuplenie Leonida Parfenova na tseremonii vrucheniia premii imeni Vladislava 
List’eva.” Channel One, at http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5817/fi6319, accessed 
November 10, 2013.
43 2013.“Leonid Parfenov ob izgnanii iz raia, proroke Dzhobse i krivom kaftane.” RBK, 
March 20, at http://top.rbc.ru/viewpoint/20/03/2013/849970.shtml, accessed November 10, 
2013.
44 Vladimir Pozner. 2012. “Chto izmenilos’ na televidenii.” Afisha. March 1, at http://gorod.
afisha.ru/archive/new-politics-tv/, accessed November 10, 2013.
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assume that, indeed, the state exerts pressure on media personalities and 
reporters whose views diverge from those of the Kremlin. However, these 
two individuals also illustrate differences in how they are managed by 
the state. Parfenov’s unpredictability caused the authorities to remove 
him from political programs on state-aligned television. By contrast, the 
regime has come to terms with Pozner, who agreed with the channel’s head, 
Konstantin Ernst, not to invite a number of prominent opposition figures.45 
This also indicates why an apparent political rebel like Shevchenko 
is acceptable for, if not welcomed by, the authorities. However provocative 
he appears, his statements remain within the boundaries of the Kremlin’s 
agenda. Predictability, and loyalty the regime can rely on, are crucial to 
survive on state-aligned television. These are, however, vague categories 
which need to be internalized by media personalities. By contrast to 
well-established Western state broadcasting companies, such as the BBC, 
who provide clear guidance to their staff, in Russia, reporters, pundits and 
anchors are confronted with unwritten rules. The logic behind this rule of 
the game became most apparent in the statements made by the rank-and-
file reporters we talked to.
Rank-and-File Reporters on Censorship
All the other reporters we interviewed universally agreed that with regard 
to censorship one must not report negatively about Vladimir Putin. The 
state-aligned networks even hire teams of special reporters to manage 
Putin’s whole news agenda. This goes back to the early 2000s when the 
federal channels developed the image of Putin as the sole leader of the 
nation. 46 If a private television channel resorts to cautious criticism, as REN 
TV has done occasionally, the term “president” is replaced with “power” 
[vlast’].47
The existence of the taboo for any critical assessment of Putin’s work 
tends to be accepted as fair and right by our interviewees: “There is a clear 
boundary. We are not allowed to cover certain topics, as is the practice on 
any channel. Just like in every family, the children are not allowed access 
to the family budget. There are boundaries everywhere. There is a special 
45 Oleg Kashin, 2013. “Vladimir Pozner: Ernst skazal, chto soglasen s kazhdym moim slo-
vom.” Colta.ru. February 26, at http://www.colta.ru/articles/media/355, accessed November 
10, 2013.
46 For further discussion on that, see Stephen Hutchings and Natalia Rulyova. 2009. Television 
and Culture in Putin’s Russia: Remote Control. London: Routledge, 33-35.
47 Interview with the REN TV reporter. The existence of relative freedom on REN TV is still 
an issue to be discussed among the experts. It is most probably explained by the need to be 
seen to have at least one major source of balanced information. For details, see Anna Kach-
kaeva. 2009. Kak sobytiia stanoviatsia ili ne stanoviatsia sobytiiami televizionnymi. January 
26, at http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/482102.html, accessed November 10, 2013.
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team that works on, with and for the president.”48 
Apart from this taboo, the reporters we interviewed denied any 
censorship, arguing that, in fact, “everything goes.”49 They claimed not 
to have experienced any direct interference or any instructions to cut out 
parts from reports or withdraw them. On the contrary, they insisted that 
their editors and bosses do not exert the slightest hint of coercive control. 
This can be partly explained by these individuals’ specific positions. Most 
of them have consciously distanced themselves from covering political 
issues, working in fields that are politically less sensitive, which allows 
them much greater freedom.50
Another reason for the freedom our interviewees claimed to have 
enjoyed might be related to the fact that television channels need to sustain 
viewers’ interest in the programs. As one of our interviewees explained, 
Channel 1 cannot aim solely at brainwashing viewers because their 
viewers will become bored and will stop watching the channel. The need 
to keep viewers’ interest ensures that the state-aligned channels keep the 
level of information censorship within certain limits.51 
Censorship and self-censorship tend to risk making reports dull 
and boring, whereas a reporter’s creativity usually does the opposite. The 
opinions and interests of many reporters often overlap with those of their 
viewers, and a reporter’s personal background and experiences will signifi-
cantly influence the content of a report and the slant it will take. This partly 
explains the appearance of shows and reports with anti-migrant, sexist or 
homophobic content. As our interviewee from NTV admitted, “I don’t like 
migrants [priezhzhikh], even though I myself moved here. But at least I’m 
not from another country… If you take them individually, put them in a 
corner and talk to them, they all are good people. But if they are in masses, 
they become unmanageable, they turn into bad people.”52 In short, unless 
a reporter’s views run counter to their employers’ editorial policies, they 
might indeed be granted great freedom in their work.
There are, however, clear mechanisms for ensuring informational 
discipline and loyalty. Almost all of our interviewees identified “adek-
vatnost’” – literally “adequacy”, but better translated as the right instinct 
combined with adroit appropriateness and a portion of wiliness – as the 
main trait required for potential candidates to be hired by a federal tele-
vision channel. One reporter defined adekvatnost’ as “the ability to react 
appropriately to the conditions in which you find yourself.”53 It is assumed 
48 Interview with the NTV reporter.
49 Interview with the NTV reporter.
50 Interview with the Channel 1 reporter.
51 Interview with the Channel 1 reporter.
52 Interview with the NTV reporter.
53 Interview with the Channel 1 reporter.
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that reporters should understand the specific character of their job and 
avoid violations of unwritten laws (which could be changed without any 
explicit notification). A reporter from NTV stated: “You understand what 
you are allowed to do and what not. It is basically on a subconscious level 
that you understand what to do… Although you can suggest whatever you 
like. If you present it appropriately [adekvatno], there is no problem.”54
Adekvatnost’ as a reporter’s characteristic is neatly tied to self-cen-
sorship. In many cases it is straightforward. When experts are consulted 
or guests invited to the studio, each reporter has their own contacts who 
are selected according to the principle of adekvatnost’. As a reporter 
explained, “anyone can be included in such a list. It is not a prescribed list 
from the Kremlin… Of course, every reporter looks for experts who are 
likely to conform to the policy of the channel.”55 It is assumed that every 
reporter who is up-to-date with political developments in the country is 
able to decide for him- or herself whom to include on their individual 
list of banned people. This requires intervention from supervisors only in 
exceptional cases.
Unexpected and rapid political changes, however, can turn self-cen-
sorship into a challenge. One interviewee told us a story about when they 
had invited a writer who fell out with Putin on the very day when the inter-
view was scheduled to take place: “We asked ourselves: maybe we should 
not have him [the writer] here anymore? And without any instruction from 
above our team decided to cancel the interview. Our producer gave him 
[the writer] some lame excuse that some technical equipment broke down 
here in the studio or something. The program is pre-recorded, so we could 
have actually just cut out some bits if necessary, but we wanted to cover 
our backs… He [the writer] instantly wrote about it on Twitter, and in the 
end we had a scandal.”56 The need for a reporter to sense what is appro-
priate at a particular moment in time might lead to insecurity and overly 
cautious approaches. 
Overall, however, our interviewees claimed to enjoy fairly unlimited 
freedom in their journalistic practice. An NTV reporter stated that “even 
on federal channels you can find a compromise with your conscience. If 
you are cultured and educated, you can easily find your way.”57 Moreover, 
reporters have the freedom to suggest topics they wish to cover as long 
54 Interview with the NTV reporter.
55 Interview with the Channel 1 reporter. Russian television experts and journalists publicly 
confirmed that several people were banned from participating in television programs. See 
2011. “Irina Petrovskaia. Televidenie. Krizis zhanra,” Fond Liberal’naia missiia, Novem-
ber 17, At: http://www.liberal.ru/articles/5493, accessed 26 February 2014; 2011. “Pozner 
rasskazal o “stop-listakh” Pervogo kanala,” Lenta.ru, 24 February, At: http://lenta.ru/
news/2011/02/24/pozner/, accessed 26 February 2014.
56 Interview with the Rossiia-24 reporter.
57 Interview with the NTV reporter.
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as they entertain the viewers, guarantee high ratings and are relevant to 
current developments.58 To enjoy the freedom to hold views which diverge 
from those of the government usually implies not being involved in the 
broadcasting of political news. This rule of the game, however, also means 
that if a reporter is keen to report on political topics, he or she will choose 
this path consciously, being well aware of all the limitations.
Conclusion 
Our interviews with both celebrity media personalities and rank-and-file 
reporters indicate that coercion is not an aspect which concerns journalism 
on federal television channels. Self-censorship is euphemistically described 
as adekvatnost’, a term which is vaguely defined, but definitely seen as a 
virtue and expression of professionalism. A close look at the practices of 
Russian reporters, pundits, anchors, editors and managers with regard to 
self-censorship reveals that they have developed their own sophisticated 
mechanisms to execute Kremlin policies, without ever making this process 
too explicit. It would be wrong to assume that the images broadcast by 
television were initiated by the Presidential Administration and imposed 
coercively onto media personalities and reporters. In many respects tele-
vision reports and talk shows disclose at least as much, if not more, of a 
media personality’s or reporter’s personal characteristics than of explicit 
political pressure and interference. 
All the media personalities and reporters we interviewed showed 
complete understanding of this form of regulating and governing media 
and information policies. Many of them hold the view that, if a media 
personality and reporter does not agree with the editorial policy of one 
media organization, he or she is free to change to another organization. 
As in Koltsova’s study of reporters working for regional channels in the 
mid-2000s, our interviewees also seem to freely promote their masters’ 
view. In the case of state-aligned channels, this is the Russian govern-
ment’s. This conclusion does not imply that all the media personalities and 
reporters we interviewed are cynics. It does imply, however, that those who 
practice political journalism do so consciously and deliberately. Whoever 
is happy to play, will play hard.
Wherever celebrity media personalities admit to “regulatory mecha-
nisms” (usually described as editorial policy), they refer to Western editorial 
practices, stating that the latter are in no way better. As in many spheres of 
life, Western practices decisively legitimize Russian practices, which our 
interviewees ferociously defended. In general, however, renowned media 
personalities, such as Mamontov and Kiselev, deny censorship as such and 
argue that neither censorship nor self-censorship is the decisive tool of 
58 Interview with the REN TV reporter.
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media governance regulating the daily news agenda on screen. And indeed, 
proximity to the decision-making centers allows them to speak freely and 
disseminate their ideas without being censored. Instead, they are part of 
the process of news production: Being important public mouthpieces for 
the Kremlin, Mamontov and Kiselev mediate the discourse produced by 
the Kremlin and, at the same time, partake in its production. 
The Russian political puzzle became even more complicated after 
2012, as the future of the political regime now looks much more unpre-
dictable than at any previous time of Putin’s rule. This challenge makes 
the political elite keep their eye on federal television as a main pillar of 
their informational power. As our analysis shows, media personalities and 
reporters are ready to employ whatever means they have to ensure stabil-
ity and the maintenance of Putin’s regime. The large majority of media 
personalities and reporters who work in state-aligned television seem to 
regard their principal role in defending the status quo. They see themselves 
as important agents of ensuring stability in the country by means of their 
programs. Their mission is to impose an order which stands in sharp 
contrast to the turbulence and the chaos of the 1990s. Especially well-
known media personalities perceive themselves as far more than simply 
reporters, pundits or anchors. They serve the country by simultaneously 
being (and having the right and vocation to be) media professionals, educa-
tors and politicians.

